Despite opposition from many within the Democratic Party and even within theWhite House against deepening US involvement in Afghanistan, President Obama hascourageously decided to fight this war--using, as he put it, "all elements ofour national power to defeat al Qaeda, and to defend America, our allies, andall who seek a better future." In a White Paper, his administration hasaffirmed that Washington aims "to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually destroyextremists and their safe havens" within the "Af-Pak" region because doingso constituted America’s "vital national security interest." All this isgood, but by failing to admit, out of political convenience, that the UnitedStates will engage in nation-building in Afghanistan--even as Obama embarks onjust that mission--the president risks undermining his own strategy.

Comprehensive engagement in Afghanistan, of course, was opposed by a variety ofconstituencies. Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), for example, warned against anyreconstruction intended "to make [Afghanistan] our 51st state," suggestinginstead that allied objectives in that country be limited to ensuring that "itdoes not become an al-Qaeda narco-state and terrorist beachhead capable ofdestabilizing neighboring Pakistan." Others, such as the former president ofthe Council on Foreign Relations, Leslie Gelb, urged Obama "to explore astrategy of power extrication" by which the United States would "leaveAfghanistan" because "trying to eliminate the Taliban and Qaeda threat[therein] is unattainable." Some other alternatives were proposed as well.David Boaz of the libertarian Cato Institute wondered whether the US would "beable to extricate [itself] sooner if we accept a decentralized Afghanistan withsome regions ruled by groups that are currently fighting against our troops?"And, one senior NATO official, reflecting the view of many European governmentseager to end their involvement in Afghanistan, has been quoted by the Guardianas arguing that Kabul "doesn’t need to be a democracy, just secure."

It is to President Obama’s credit that, despite strong pressures emerging fromvarious quarters, he has rejected all of these alternatives in favor of buildingan effective democratic state in Afghanistan. That is the good news. If successin Afghanistan--understood as the extirpation of al-Qaeda and themarginalization of the Taliban as an armed opposition--is to be achieved,Washington and its partners will have no choice but to erect an effective Afghanstate that can control its national territory and deliver its citizens security,responsive governance, and economic development necessary to ensure internalstability. Nothing less will suffice for attaining even the most minimalstrategic aim in Kabul. Obama’s new "Af-Pak" policy suggests that he hasunderstood this clearly and his administration’s White Paper corroborates hisintention to pursue precisely this goal. The bad news, however, is that theadministration has spelled this out only indistinctly and by circumlocution.

President Obama has asserted that the United States will have a "clear andfocused goal," namely, "to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda inPakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in thefuture." Toward this end, he has rejected any "return to Taliban rule"; hehas upheld the need for "a more capable, accountable, and effective governmentin Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people"; and he has endorsed theobjective of "developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces thatcan lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S.assistance."

Whether explicitly admitted or not, these propositions indicate that the UnitedStates will not abdicate state building in Afghanistan; will not recognize theTaliban as an acceptable Islamist group in contrast to, for example, al-Qaeda;and will not exit Afghanistan either as an end in itself or to better focus onPakistan, as some analysts have suggested. The administration’s reiteration ofthe need for a "a more capable, accountable, and effective government inAfghanistan" also implicitly conveys a rejection of all ambiguous strategiesof governance, a refusal to integrate an unrepentant Taliban into any Afghanorgans of rule, and a decisive repudiation of authoritarianism as a solution tothe political problems in Kabul.

But, the failure to transparently declare that the United States is committed tobuilding an effective democratic state in Afghanistan--a circumvention owedprobably as much to appeasing fears within the Democratic Party as it is tocalming NATO partners about nation-building--has opened the door to unreasonableexpectations that his strategy for defeating terrorism in Afghanistan (andPakistan) can be implemented without, what the New York Times calls, "the vastattempt at nation-building [that] the Bush administration had sought in Iraq."As the civilian surge already underway in Afghanistan suggests, theadministration understands that successful counterterrorism needs successfulstate building. But the failure to own up to this could prove to be thestrategy’s undoing--within Congress and among the allies. Accordingly, thepresident should clarify this ambiguity at the earliest opportunity.

Other doubts need to be cleared up as well: besides affirming the importance ofa democratic regime in Kabul, the president needs to tell the American peopleclearly that the necessary task of state building will almost by definition be along term enterprise and, accordingly, will demand an extended American presencein Afghanistan. Entertaining the notion of "exit strategy," as PresidentObama himself has done previously, is dangerous because it will spur theinsurgents to outlast the international coalition; encourage important Afghanbystanders to persist in their prevailing ambivalence; and be a disincentive toIslamabad to relinquishing its support for the Taliban because after the USwithdrawal they may once again be required to protect Pakistan’s interests inKabul.

To demonstrate that he is serious, however, Obama must also do more beyond whathe has already committed to doing. He needs to commit far more American troopsto Afghanistan than the 55,000-odd soldiers that will soon be present in thetheater, if the counterinsurgency campaign in the southern and eastern Afghanprovinces is to be successful. He needs to build the Afghan National Army to anend-strength of about 250,000 soldiers (vice the 134,000 now targeted) if theappropriate force-to-population ratios needed for the counterinsurgency are tobe sustained. He needs to revamp considerably the current command and controlarrangements pertaining to both military operations and civil-militarycoordination in Afghanistan. He needs to work with Kabul to improve quickly thequality of governance and the delivery of services to the people most hit by theTaliban insurgency. And, he needs to jettison those old and tired saws thatreconciliation with the Taliban or better counterterrorism performance byPakistan will be essential for success in Afghanistan; although both may well betrue, neither is particularly likely and, consequently, Obama ought to refocuson securing victory in Afghanistan by "hardening" it from the inside outrather than by counting on either Taliban or Pakistani cooperation.

Old Washington hands ruefully note that all incoming administrations usually gettheir first reviews of pressing policy problems mostly wrong. Obama seems tohave beaten that rap. While his policy has got it mostly right, it is stilltarred by risky ambiguities and incomplete actions. That’s the unfinishedbusiness Obama must now attend to.